Can We Upload Our Minds Into Robot Bodies

Hypothetical process of digitally emulating a encephalon

Listen uploading, as well known as whole brain emulation (WBE), is the theoretical futuristic process of scanning a physical construction of the brain accurately enough to create an emulation of the mental land (including long-term memory and "self") and transferring or copying it to a calculator in a digital course. The computer would and so run a simulation of the brain's information processing, such that it would respond in substantially the same way as the original brain and feel having a sentient conscious mind.^{[one] [two] [three]}

Substantial mainstream research in related areas is being conducted in animal encephalon mapping and simulation, evolution of faster supercomputers, virtual reality, brain–reckoner interfaces, connectomics, and information extraction from dynamically functioning brains.^[iv] According to supporters, many of the tools and ideas needed to achieve heed uploading already exist or are currently nether active evolution; even so, they will admit that others are, as yet, very speculative, just say they are withal in the realm of engineering possibility.

Mind uploading may potentially be accomplished past either of two methods: copy-and-upload or copy-and-delete by gradual replacement of neurons (which can be considered as a gradual destructive uploading), until the original organic encephalon no longer exists and a figurer programme emulating the brain takes control over the torso. In the instance of the old method, mind uploading would be accomplished by scanning and mapping the salient features of a biological brain, and and so past storing and copying, that information state into a computer organisation or another computational device. The biological brain may not survive the copying process or may be deliberately destroyed during it in some variants of uploading. The simulated mind could exist within a virtual reality or imitation world, supported by an anatomic 3D body simulation model. Alternatively, the faux listen could reside in a computer inside (or either connected to or remotely controlled) a (not necessarily humanoid) robot or a biological or cybernetic trunk.^[5]

Amongst some futurists and inside the office of transhumanist movement, mind uploading is treated as an important proposed life extension technology. Some believe listen uploading is humanity's current best option for preserving the identity of the species, as opposed to cryonics. Another aim of heed uploading is to provide a permanent backup to our "mind-file", to enable interstellar infinite travel, and a means for homo civilization to survive a global disaster by making a functional copy of a human society in a computing device. Whole-brain emulation is discussed by some futurists as a "logical endpoint"^[5] of the topical computational neuroscience and neuroinformatics fields, both almost brain simulation for medical inquiry purposes. It is discussed in artificial intelligence enquiry publications as an approach to strong AI (artificial general intelligence) and to at least weak superintelligence. Another approach is seed AI, which wouldn't be based on existing brains. Computer-based intelligence such equally an upload could think much faster than a biological human even if information technology were no more intelligent. A large-scale society of uploads might, co-ordinate to futurists, give rise to a technological singularity, meaning a sudden fourth dimension constant decrease in the exponential evolution of engineering science.^[6] Mind uploading is a central conceptual feature of numerous science fiction novels, films, and games.

Overview [edit]

The established neuroscientific consensus is that the human mind is largely an emergent property of the information processing of its neuronal network.^[seven]

Neuroscientists take stated that important functions performed past the listen, such as learning, retention, and consciousness, are due to purely concrete and electrochemical processes in the brain and are governed by applicable laws. For example, Christof Koch and Giulio Tononi wrote in IEEE Spectrum:

Consciousness is office of the natural world. It depends, nosotros believe, only on mathematics and logic and on the imperfectly known laws of physics, chemical science, and biology; information technology does non arise from some magical or otherworldly quality.^[8]

The concept of heed uploading is based on this mechanistic view of the heed, and denies the vitalist view of human life and consciousness.^[9]

Eminent reckoner scientists and neuroscientists have predicted that avant-garde computers volition be capable of thought and fifty-fifty reach consciousness, including Koch and Tononi,^[8] Douglas Hofstadter,^[10] Jeff Hawkins,^[10] Marvin Minsky,^[11] Randal A. Koene, and Rodolfo Llinás.^[12]

Many theorists have presented models of the brain and take established a range of estimates of the amount of computing power needed for partial and complete simulations.^{[5] [ commendation needed ]} Using these models, some have estimated that uploading may become possible within decades if trends such as Moore'south law continue.^[thirteen]

Theoretical benefits and applications [edit]

"Immortality" or backup [edit]

In theory, if the information and processes of the mind can be disassociated from the biological body, they are no longer tied to the individual limits and lifespan of that body. Furthermore, data within a brain could exist partly or wholly copied or transferred to one or more other substrates (including digital storage or another brain), thereby – from a purely mechanistic perspective – reducing or eliminating "mortality risk" of such information. This general proposal was discussed in 1971 by biogerontologist George M. Martin of the University of Washington.^[14]

Space exploration [edit]

An "uploaded astronaut" could exist used instead of a "alive" astronaut in human spaceflight, fugitive the perils of zero gravity, the vacuum of space, and catholic radiation to the man torso. Information technology would allow for the utilise of smaller spacecraft, such equally the proposed StarChip, and information technology would enable almost unlimited interstellar travel distances.^[15]

Relevant technologies and techniques [edit]

The focus of mind uploading, in the case of copy-and-transfer, is on information conquering, rather than data maintenance of the brain. A gear up of approaches known as loosely coupled off-loading (LCOL) may be used in the effort to characterize and copy the mental contents of a brain.^[16] The LCOL approach may take reward of self-reports, life-logs and video recordings that tin be analyzed by bogus intelligence. A bottom-upwards approach may focus on the specific resolution and morphology of neurons, the fasten times of neurons, the times at which neurons produce action potential responses.

Computational complication [edit]

Estimates of how much processing ability is needed to emulate a human encephalon at diverse levels, along with the fastest and slowest supercomputers from TOP500 and a $1000 PC. Notation the logarithmic calibration. The (exponential) trend line for the fastest supercomputer reflects a doubling every 14 months. Kurzweil believes that mind uploading will be possible at neural simulation, while the Sandberg & Bostrom report is less certain about where consciousness arises.^[17]

Advocates of mind uploading point to Moore's law to support the notion that the necessary computing power is expected to go available within a few decades. However, the actual computational requirements for running an uploaded man mind are very difficult to quantify, potentially rendering such an argument specious.

Regardless of the techniques used to capture or recreate the part of a human listen, the processing demands are likely to exist immense, due to the large number of neurons in the human encephalon along with the considerable complexity of each neuron.

In 2004, Henry Markram, lead researcher of the Blue Brain Project, stated that "it is not [their] goal to build an intelligent neural network", based solely on the computational demands such a project would have.^[xviii]

Information technology will be very difficult because, in the brain, every molecule is a powerful figurer and we would need to simulate the structure and function of trillions upon trillions of molecules as well every bit all the rules that govern how they collaborate. You would literally demand computers that are trillions of times bigger and faster than anything existing today.^[19]

Five years later, after successful simulation of part of a rat brain, Markram was much more bold and optimistic. In 2009, equally managing director of the Blue Brain Projection, he claimed that "A detailed, functional artificial human brain tin be built within the next 10 years".^[20] Less than 2 years into it, the projection was recognized to be mismanaged and its claims overblown, and Markram was asked to step downwardly.^{[21] [22]}

Required computational capacity strongly depend on the chosen level of simulation model calibration:^[v]

Estimates from Sandberg, Bostrom, 2008

Level	CPU need (FLOPS)	Memory demand (Tb)	$1 million super‐calculator (Earliest yr of making)
Analog network population model	ten15	x2	2008
Spiking neural network	xeighteen	x4	2019
Electrophysiology	1022	104	2033
Metabolome	x25	10half dozen	2044
Proteome	1026	10seven	2048
States of protein complexes	1027	x8	2052
Distribution of complexes	x30	tennine	2063
Stochastic behavior of single molecules	1043	1014	2111

Scanning and mapping scale of an individual [edit]

When modelling and simulating the encephalon of a specific private, a encephalon map or connectivity database showing the connections between the neurons must exist extracted from an anatomic model of the brain. For whole encephalon simulation, this network map should evidence the connectivity of the whole nervous organisation, including the spinal cord, sensory receptors, and muscle cells. Subversive scanning of a small sample of tissue from a mouse encephalon including synaptic details is possible equally of 2010.^[23]

However, if short-term retentiveness and working retention include prolonged or repeated firing of neurons, besides as intra-neural dynamic processes, the electric and chemical betoken land of the synapses and neurons may be hard to extract. The uploaded heed may then perceive a memory loss of the events and mental processes immediately before the time of encephalon scanning.^[v]

A total brain map has been estimated to occupy less than 2 x 10^sixteen bytes (20,000 TB) and would store the addresses of the connected neurons, the synapse type and the synapse "weight" for each of the brains' ten¹⁵ synapses.^{[5] [ failed verification ]} However, the biological complexities of true encephalon function (e.g. the epigenetic states of neurons, protein components with multiple functional states, etc.) may preclude an accurate prediction of the volume of binary information required to faithfully represent a performance human being listen.

Series sectioning [edit]

Serial sectioning of a brain

A possible method for mind uploading is serial sectioning, in which the brain tissue and perhaps other parts of the nervous system are frozen and and then scanned and analyzed layer by layer, which for frozen samples at nano-scale requires a cryo-ultramicrotome, thus capturing the structure of the neurons and their interconnections.^[24] The exposed surface of frozen nerve tissue would be scanned and recorded, and then the surface layer of tissue removed. While this would be a very slow and labor-intensive process, inquiry is currently underway to automate the collection and microscopy of serial sections.^[25] The scans would then be analyzed, and a model of the neural net recreated in the system that the mind was being uploaded into.

There are uncertainties with this arroyo using current microscopy techniques. If it is possible to replicate neuron part from its visible construction alone, then the resolution afforded by a scanning electron microscope would suffice for such a technique.^[25] Withal, equally the part of brain tissue is partially determined past molecular events (particularly at synapses, merely likewise at other places on the neuron's cell membrane), this may not suffice for capturing and simulating neuron functions. It may be possible to extend the techniques of serial sectioning and to capture the internal molecular makeup of neurons, through the employ of sophisticated immunohistochemistry staining methods that could and then be read via confocal laser scanning microscopy. However, as the physiological genesis of 'mind' is not currently known, this method may not be able to access all of the necessary biochemical data to recreate a human being brain with sufficient fidelity.

Brain imaging [edit]

Process from MRI acquisition to whole brain structural network^[26]

It may be possible to create functional 3D maps of the brain activity, using advanced neuroimaging engineering science, such every bit functional MRI (fMRI, for mapping change in blood flow), magnetoencephalography (Million, for mapping of electric currents), or combinations of multiple methods, to build a detailed three-dimensional model of the brain using not-invasive and non-destructive methods. Today, fMRI is often combined with MEG for creating functional maps of human being cortex during more complex cognitive tasks, as the methods complement each other. Even though electric current imaging engineering lacks the spatial resolution needed to gather the data needed for such a scan, important recent and future developments are predicted to substantially better both spatial and temporal resolutions of existing technologies.^[27]

Encephalon simulation [edit]

There is ongoing work in the field of brain simulation, including fractional and whole simulations of some animals. For example, the C. elegans roundworm, Drosophila fruit wing, and mouse accept all been fake to various degrees.^{[ commendation needed ]}

The Bluish Brain Project by the Brain and Mind Constitute of the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Switzerland is an attempt to create a constructed brain past reverse-engineering mammalian brain circuitry.

Problems [edit]

Practical issues [edit]

This section needs expansion. You can help past adding to information technology. (June 2020)

Kenneth D. Miller, a professor of neuroscience at Columbia and a co-director of the Middle for Theoretical Neuroscience, raised doubts about the practicality of mind uploading. His major argument is that reconstructing neurons and their connections is in itself a formidable chore, but it is far from existence sufficient. Operation of the brain depends on the dynamics of electrical and biochemical bespeak substitution between neurons; therefore, capturing them in a unmarried "frozen" state may prove insufficient. In addition, the nature of these signals may require modeling down to the molecular level and beyond. Therefore, while not rejecting the idea in principle, Miller believes that the complexity of the "absolute" duplication of an private heed is insurmountable for the nearest hundreds of years.^[28]

Philosophical issues [edit]

Underlying the concept of "listen uploading" (more accurately "mind transferring") is the broad philosophy that consciousness lies within the brain's information processing and is in essence an emergent feature that arises from large neural network high-level patterns of arrangement, and that the same patterns of organization can exist realized in other processing devices. Mind uploading also relies on the idea that the human mind (the "self" and the long-term retentivity), merely like non-man minds, is represented by the current neural network paths and the weights of the brain synapses rather than by a dualistic and mystic soul and spirit. The mind or "soul" can exist defined as the information state of the brain, and is immaterial merely in the same sense as the data content of a data file or the state of a reckoner software currently residing in the work-space retentivity of the computer. Data specifying the information land of the neural network can exist captured and copied as a "computer file" from the brain and re-implemented into a dissimilar concrete form.^[29] This is not to deny that minds are richly adapted to their substrates.^[xxx] An analogy to the idea of mind uploading is to copy the temporary information land (the variable values) of a computer plan from the computer retentivity to another computer and go on its execution. The other computer may perhaps take different hardware architecture but emulates the hardware of the first computer.

These bug have a long history. In 1775, Thomas Reid wrote:^[31] "I would be glad to know... whether when my encephalon has lost its original structure, and when some hundred years later the same materials are fabricated so curiously as to get an intelligent beingness, whether, I say that being will be me; or, if, two or 3 such beings should be formed out of my brain; whether they will all be me, and consequently one and the same intelligent existence."

A considerable portion of transhumanists and singularitarians place groovy hope into the conventionalities that they may become immortal, by creating one or many not-biological functional copies of their brains, thereby leaving their "biological shell". Nevertheless, the philosopher and transhumanist Susan Schneider claims that at best, uploading would create a copy of the original person's heed.^[32] Schneider agrees that consciousness has a computational basis, but this does non mean we tin upload and survive. Co-ordinate to her views, "uploading" would probably consequence in the death of the original person's brain, while only outside observers can maintain the illusion of the original person nevertheless being alive. For it is implausible to think that i'southward consciousness would leave ane's brain and travel to a remote location; ordinary concrete objects do not behave this way. Ordinary objects (rocks, tables, etc.) are non simultaneously hither, and elsewhere. At best, a copy of the original mind is created.^[32] Neural correlates of consciousness, a sub-co-operative of neuroscience, states that consciousness may be thought of equally a state-dependent holding of some undefined circuitous, adaptive, and highly interconnected biological organisation.^[33]

Others have argued against such conclusions. For instance, Buddhist transhumanist James Hughes has pointed out that this consideration merely goes so far: if one believes the self is an illusion, worries about survival are not reasons to avert uploading,^[34] and Keith Wiley has presented an argument wherein all resulting minds of an uploading procedure are granted equal primacy in their claim to the original identity, such that survival of the self is determined retroactively from a strictly subjective position.^{[35] [36]} Some have as well asserted that consciousness is a part of an extra-biological system that is all the same to be discovered; therefore information technology cannot be fully understood under the present constraints of neurobiology. Without the transference of consciousness, truthful heed-upload or perpetual immortality cannot be practically accomplished.^[37]

Another potential consequence of heed uploading is that the conclusion to "upload" may then create a mindless symbol manipulator instead of a conscious listen (see philosophical zombie).^{[38] [39]} Are we to presume that an upload is witting if information technology displays behaviors that are highly indicative of consciousness? Are we to presume that an upload is witting if information technology verbally insists that it is conscious?^[forty] Could there exist an accented upper limit in processing speed above which consciousness cannot exist sustained? The mystery of consciousness precludes a definitive reply to this question.^[41] Numerous scientists, including Kurzweil, strongly believe that the answer as to whether a split up entity is conscious (with 100% conviction) is fundamentally unknowable, since consciousness is inherently subjective (see solipsism). Regardless, some scientists strongly believe consciousness is the consequence of computational processes which are substrate-neutral. On the contrary, numerous scientists believe consciousness may be the result of some form of quantum ciphering dependent on substrate (see quantum heed).^{[42] [43] [44]}

In light of doubt on whether to regard uploads every bit conscious, Sandberg proposes a cautious approach:^[45]

Principle of bold the most (PAM): Assume that whatever emulated arrangement could have the same mental backdrop every bit the original system and treat it correspondingly.

Ethical and legal implications [edit]

The process of developing emulation technology raises ethical problems related to animal welfare and bogus consciousness.^[45] The neuroscience required to develop brain emulation would require animal experimentation, offset on invertebrates and then on small mammals earlier moving on to humans. Sometimes the animals would merely need to be euthanized in society to extract, piece, and scan their brains, only sometimes behavioral and in vivo measures would be required, which might cause pain to living animals.^[45]

In improver, the resulting animal emulations themselves might suffer, depending on ane'southward views about consciousness.^[45] Bancroft argues for the plausibility of consciousness in brain simulations on the basis of the "fading qualia" thought experiment of David Chalmers. He then concludes:^[46] "If, as I contend above, a sufficiently detailed computational simulation of the brain is potentially operationally equivalent to an organic encephalon, it follows that we must consider extending protections against suffering to simulations."

Information technology might help reduce emulation suffering to develop virtual equivalents of anaesthesia, equally well as to omit processing related to pain and/or consciousness. Even so, some experiments might require a fully operation and suffering fauna emulation. Animals might as well suffer past accident due to flaws and lack of insight into what parts of their brains are suffering.^[45] Questions also arise regarding the moral status of partial encephalon emulations, besides as creating neuromorphic emulations that draw inspiration from biological brains merely are congenital somewhat differently.^[46]

Brain emulations could be erased by computer viruses or malware, without demand to destroy the underlying hardware. This may make bump-off easier than for physical humans. The assailant might take the computing ability for its ain employ.^[47]

Many questions arise regarding the legal personhood of emulations.^[48] Would they be given the rights of biological humans? If a person makes an emulated copy of themselves and then dies, does the emulation inherit their property and official positions? Could the emulation ask to "pull the plug" when its biological version was terminally ill or in a blackout? Would it assistance to treat emulations as adolescents for a few years and so that the biological creator would maintain temporary control? Would criminal emulations receive the death penalty, or would they be given forced data modification as a form of "rehabilitation"? Could an upload accept marriage and child-care rights?^[48]

If simulated minds would come up truthful and if they were assigned rights of their own, information technology may be difficult to ensure the protection of "digital human rights". For example, social science researchers might be tempted to secretly expose fake minds, or whole isolated societies of simulated minds, to controlled experiments in which many copies of the same minds are exposed (serially or simultaneously) to different test conditions.^{[ citation needed ]}

Political and economical implications [edit]

Emulations could create a number of conditions that might increase chance of war, including inequality, changes of power dynamics, a possible technological artillery race to build emulations offset, first-strike advantages, strong loyalty and willingness to "die" among emulations, and triggers for racist, xenophobic, and religious prejudice.^[47] If emulations run much faster than humans, there might not be plenty time for man leaders to make wise decisions or negotiate. It is possible that humans would react violently against growing ability of emulations, especially if they depress human wages. Emulations may not trust each other, and even well-intentioned defensive measures might exist interpreted every bit criminal offence.^[47]

Emulation timelines and AI chance [edit]

In that location are very few feasible technologies that humans have refrained from developing. The neuroscience and computer-hardware technologies that may make brain emulation possible are widely desired for other reasons, and logically their development will continue into the future. Assuming that emulation technology will arrive, a question becomes whether we should accelerate or slow its advance.^[47]

Arguments for speeding up brain-emulation inquiry:

• If neuroscience is the bottleneck on encephalon emulation rather than computing ability, emulation advances may be more than erratic and unpredictable based on when new scientific discoveries happen.^{[47] [49] [50]} Express calculating power would mean the first emulations would run slower and so would be easier to arrange to, and there would exist more time for the technology to transition through society.^[50]
• Improvements in manufacturing, 3D printing, and nanotechnology may accelerate hardware product,^[47] which could increase the "computing overhang"^[51] from excess hardware relative to neuroscience.
• If one AI-development group had a lead in emulation engineering, it would accept more subjective time to win an arms race to build the outset superhuman AI. Because it would be less rushed, it would accept more freedom to consider AI risks.^{[52] [53]}

Arguments for slowing downwardly encephalon-emulation research:

• Greater investment in brain emulation and associated cognitive science might enhance the power of artificial intelligence (AI) researchers to create "neuromorphic" (brain-inspired) algorithms, such as neural networks, reinforcement learning, and hierarchical perception. This could accelerate risks from uncontrolled AI.^{[47] [53]} Participants at a 2011 AI workshop estimated an 85% probability that neuromorphic AI would arrive earlier brain emulation. This was based on the idea that encephalon emulation would require understanding some brain components, and it would be easier to tinker with these than to reconstruct the entire encephalon in its original grade. Past a very narrow margin, the participants on balance leaned toward the view that accelerating brain emulation would increase expected AI risk.^[52]
• Waiting might requite lodge more fourth dimension to think well-nigh the consequences of brain emulation and develop institutions to improve cooperation.^{[47] [53]}

Emulation inquiry would also speed upwardly neuroscience every bit a whole, which might accelerate medical advances, cognitive enhancement, lie detectors, and adequacy for psychological manipulation.^[53]

Emulations might be easier to control than de novo AI considering

1. Human abilities, behavioral tendencies, and vulnerabilities are more thoroughly understood, thus control measures might be more intuitive and easier to programme for.^{[52] [53]}
2. Emulations could more easily inherit human motivations.^[53]
3. Emulations are harder to manipulate than de novo AI, because brains are messy and complicated; this could reduce risks of their rapid takeoff.^{[47] [53]} As well, emulations may be bulkier and require more hardware than AI, which would also slow the speed of a transition.^[53] Unlike AI, an emulation wouldn't exist able to rapidly expand beyond the size of a human encephalon.^[53] Emulations running at digital speeds would take less intelligence differential vis-à-vis AI and and then might more easily command AI.^[53]

Every bit counterpoint to these considerations, Bostrom notes some downsides:

1. Even if nosotros better understand human behavior, the evolution of emulation behavior under self-improvement might exist much less predictable than the evolution of safety de novo AI under self-improvement.^[53]
2. Emulations may not inherit all man motivations. Perhaps they would inherit our darker motivations or would deport abnormally in the unfamiliar environment of cyberspace.^[53]
3. Even if there's a slow takeoff toward emulations, there would nonetheless be a second transition to de novo AI later on. Two intelligence explosions may mean more full take a chance.^[53]

Because of the postulated difficulties that a whole brain emulation-generated superintelligence would pose for the control problem, reckoner scientist Stuart J. Russell in his book Human Uniform rejects creating one, just calling it "then obviously a bad idea".^[54]

Advocates [edit]

Ray Kurzweil, director of technology at Google, has long predicted that people will be able to "upload" their entire brains to computers and become "digitally immortal" by 2045. Kurzweil fabricated this claim for many years, east.g. during his oral communication in 2013 at the Global Futures 2045 International Congress in New York, which claims to subscribe to a similar ready of behavior.^[55] Mind uploading has too been advocated past a number of researchers in neuroscience and artificial intelligence, such every bit the late Marvin Minsky.^{[ citation needed ]} In 1993, Joe Strout created a small web site called the Mind Uploading Home Folio, and began advocating the idea in cryonics circles and elsewhere on the internet. That site has not been actively updated in recent years, but it has spawned other sites including MindUploading.org, run past Randal A. Koene, who besides moderates a mailing listing on the topic. These advocates meet mind uploading every bit a medical procedure which could eventually save countless lives.

Many transhumanists expect forwards to the development and deployment of mind uploading engineering, with transhumanists such as Nick Bostrom predicting that it will get possible within the 21st century due to technological trends such every bit Moore's police force.^[5]

Michio Kaku, in collaboration with Science, hosted a documentary, Sci Fi Scientific discipline: Physics of the Incommunicable, based on his book Physics of the Incommunicable. Episode four, titled "How to Teleport", mentions that heed uploading via techniques such as breakthrough entanglement and whole brain emulation using an advanced MRI motorcar may enable people to be transported vast distances at almost light-speed.

The book Beyond Humanity: CyberEvolution and Future Minds by Gregory South. Paul & Earl D. Cox, is most the eventual (and, to the authors, well-nigh inevitable) evolution of computers into sentient beings, but also deals with human being listen transfer. Richard Doyle's Wetwares: Experiments in PostVital Living deals extensively with uploading from the perspective of distributed apotheosis, arguing for case that humans are currently part of the "artificial life phenotype". Doyle'due south vision reverses the polarity on uploading, with artificial life forms such as uploads actively seeking out biological apotheosis every bit part of their reproductive strategy.

Meet besides [edit]

• Mind uploading in fiction
• Brain Initiative
• Encephalon transplant
• Brain-reading
• Cyborg
• Cylon (reimagining)
• Autonomous transhumanism
• Human Brain Project
• Isolated brain
• Neuralink
• Posthumanization
• Robotoid
• Ship of Theseus—thought experiment asking if objects having all parts replaced fundamentally remain the same object
• Simulation hypothesis
• Simulism
• Technologically enabled telepathy
• Turing test
• The Futurity of Piece of work and Expiry
• Chinese room

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading

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